Members of the European Parliament (MEP) typically follow one of two career paths, either advancing within the European Parliament itself or returning to higher office in their home states. We argue that these different ambitions condition legislative behavior. Specifically, MEPs seeking domestic careers defect from group-leadership votes more frequently and oppose legislation that expands the purview of supranational institutions. We show how individual, domestic-party, and national level variables shape the careers available to MEPs and, in turn, their voting choices. To test the argument, we analyze MEPs' roll-call voting behavior in the 5th session of the EP (1999EP ( -2004 using a random effects model that captures idiosyncrasies in voting behavior across both individual MEPs and specific roll-call votes. * We thank Brian Gaines, Jude Hays, Robert Pahre, Kevin Quinn, Tom Rudolph, and Guy Whitten for helpful assistance. We also acknowledge the funding support of the European Union Center at the University of Illinois.
Politicians are ambitious. Some legislators wish to remain in their current positions for multiple terms, others aspire to other offices, and still others expect to serve in politics for only a short time (Schlesinger 1966) . Those career ambitions shape behavior. A legislator's expectations about future office affect the choices she makes while serving in her current position (Hibbing 1986 ). Demonstrating empirical support for the importance of political ambition, however, is not straightforward. While research has focused on behavior across legislatures with a variety of career ladders (see e.g. Black 1972 , Rhode 1979 , Epstein, Brady, Kawato & O'Halloran 1997 , Samuels 2003 , those studies center on a single country, limiting the possible variation in career-oriented behavior. Since only a small number of other positions are likely to arouse the ambitions of serving legislators, it is difficult to disentangle how the characteristics of the legislature, its members, and the opportunity structure interact to influence legislative behavior.
1
We take advantage of a unique institutional laboratory to investigate how ambition affects vote choice: the European Parliament (EP). The EP houses politicians from all member states of the European Union (EU), each with a different set of national political institutions, party systems, and political opportunity structures. Members of the European Parliament (MEP) typically follow one of two career paths (Stolz 2001 , Scarrow 1997 . Some MEPs prefer to advance within the EP itself, gaining seniority and access to key leadership positions.
Other MEPs view their time in the EP as a valuable stepping-stone to higher office in their home state. We argue that these different career ambitions condition legislative behavior within the EP. Those MEPs seeking to remain in the EP further their careers by pleasing EP group leaders and will work to expand the authority of Europe's supranational institutions relative to member-state governments. MEPs expecting to return to domestic political positions, in contrast, have less reason to abide their parliamentary groups. They also have incentives to preserve member-state powers and prerogatives at the expense of supranational institutions. Because MEPs have the opportunity to pursue a variety of future offices, their behavior illuminates the role of institutional variables in the ambition calculus-such as electoral institutions and political party characteristics-which do not generally vary within national legislatures.
We contend that individual, domestic-party, and national level variables shape career opportunities available to MEPs and, in turn, their legislative behavior. To test the argument, we analyze MEPs' roll-call voting behavior in the 5th session of the EP (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) . The data indicate substantial variability in behavior across both individual MEPs and roll-call votes. Traditional approaches typically consider only across-legislator variability and ignore the differences between votes. We demonstrate that across-vote differences can significantly outweigh between-legislator variation. Ignoring either factor may lead to overconfidence in the results. Therefore, we use a crossed random-effects model to account for idiosyncrasies in voting behavior across both individual MEPs and specific roll-call votes. Substantively, the results indicate that nationally ambitious MEPs change their voting behavior in anticipation of national elections, demonstrating how politicians' time horizons interact with their progressive ambition. Further, MEPs planning moves to national office oppose legislation that expands the purview of supranational institutions, strengthening their expected future offices and prioritizing future constituencies. The personal ambition of MEPs, therefore, has a critical effect on European lawmaking and the pace of integration.
Political Ambition and the European Parliament
Americanist scholars first argued for political ambition's important role in conditioning legislator behavior (Schlesinger 1966 , Black 1972 , Rhode 1979 . They contended that "almost all elected officials have progressive ambition" and hope to move upward to more powerful, prestigious offices (Copeland 1989, 552) . To ensure success, these politicians make policy choices that satisfy not only their own current constituents, but also potential future constituents (Hibbing 1986) . Politicians anticipating only minor chances to move to more important offices, however, have little incentive to support legislation specifically targeting future constituents. Instead, they seek to maximize the influence of their current position by climbing the legislature's internal hierarchy and expanding the policy authority of those institutions (Hibbing 1999 , Squire 1988 . In either situation, ambition strongly shapes current behavior. More recently, scholars have applied these insights to legislatures in other countries, showing how the institutional environment determines opportunities for advancement (Samuels 2003 , Carey 1996 , Epstein et al. 1997 , Cox, Rosenbluth & Thies 2000 .
The institutional structure of the EP is unique in how it shapes legislative careers. MEPs are elected in national-level elections to serve a five year-term in the EP. Currently, all member states use proportional representation in "European" elections. National-level parties control nominations to European elections. Candidates in EP elections, therefore, owe allegiance to their national party. Further, if a candidate seeks to return to domestic politics, she will have to seek her party's nomination in the domestic election. Once elected to the EP, however, MEPs sit in "groups". Groups are composed of MEPs from different parties across member states. The largest group in the 5th EP, the Group of the European People's Party (EPP-ED), includes members from more than 30 national-level parties. These groups structure the agenda and determine parliamentary leadership within the EP, much as political parties do in national-level parliaments.
In general, MEPs have strong incentives to vote with their group leaderships. While EP groups have little control over electoral nominations, they exert impressive influence within the EP itself. Group leaders dole out committee assignments, control the speaking agenda within the parliament, propose bill amendments, and nominate MEPs to the Parliamentary Bureau, the body responsible for the EP's budget and agenda. Groups employ coordinators-essentially whips-who signal leadership preferences to backbenchers during floor votes. These coordinators monitor how MEPs vote, potentially allowing them to punish recalcitrant MEPs. Thus, MEPs have good reason to consistently toe the group line.
Nonetheless, ambition affects the willingness of MEPs to follow their group. MEPs face a distinct choice of career paths. Descriptive evidence shows that some MEPs desire positions of power within European institutions while others seek a return to domestic office. In the years following the advent of direct election to the EP, 2 it was conventional wisdom that MEPs were strongly motivated by a wish to return to national politics. To test this, Scarrow (1997) Further, we expect these differences to be particularly pronounced for issues relating to the power and authority of European institutions. MEPs who plan to remain in Brussels benefit from stronger European institutions. By expanding the powers of European institutions, careerist MEPs enhance their own influence and prestige as they work their way up the EP hierarchy. MEPs hoping for future national office, on the other hand, need to appeal to domestic parties and voters. They work to advantage member states in terms of policy and spending and to preserve member sovereignty within the structure of EU institutions.
Therefore, we expect these MEPs to support fewer powers for supranational institutions.
Ambition theory predicts that politicians make decisions based on the potential benefits of alternative offices and the probability of achieving those positions. If opportunities to move up the ladder are plentiful or if politicians think they are likely to succeed, politicians behave in a manner that appeals to future constituents. If there are few opportunities to succeed or if the probability of achieving those positions is low, politicians focus on satisfying the policy demands of their current constituents.
For MEPs, therefore, their behavior reflects a calculation about the relative merits of a career in Brussels against a career in their home country. If an MEP believes that political opportunities in her home state are few, if those opportunities possess only limited importance, or if she has little chance of succeeding in attaining them, then a career in Brussels becomes more attractive. In turn, she is more likely to go along with her parliamentary group and to support policies that enhance the power and influence of European institutions.
On the other hand, MEPs may view domestic office as a more attractive career option, one that provides more policy influence than serving as an MEP. If the possibility of a domestic career is relatively high, then MEPs tailor their behavior toward the concerns of national constituents, being both more willing to defy the EP group leadership and more antagonistic toward augmenting the power of European institutions.
We argue that individual characteristics, domestic party structures, and national institutions influence an MEP's career prospects and, in turn, her legislative behavior.
Individual Level Variables
Individual characteristics shape electoral fortunes and the possibility of changing careers.
Age
The literature (e.g., Hain 1974) have. These experienced politicians are likely to be tapped for national service. Therefore, we expect that MEPs from small national parties will be more likely to defect from group votes than MEPs from large national parties.
Party's Presence in Government
Whether the MEP's party participates in government at the national level affects the MEP's calculations. Holding a legislative post in a party that serves in government makes a domestic level career goal an attractive option. Sitting with a party in power translates to a greater chance of affecting policy and holding a plum government position. At the same time, if the party serves in government, it increases the competition for party nominations, making it less likely that an MEP could successfully jump back into national politics.
The governing status of the MEP's home party has another influence on MEP behavior. (Hix, Noury & Roland 2006, 509) . In this situation, both group and national party pressures align to encourage the maintenance of group discipline. Therefore, we predict that
MEPs are less likely to defect when their home party serves in the government.
Member State Characteristics

National Elections
National elections structure the timing of any potential return to domestic office. 5 As elections approach, parties can call MEPs home to serve as candidates. For politicians using the EP as a stepping-stone to domestic positions, therefore, it is important to please national parties and domestic constituents in the period leading up to elections. MEPs who are confident that they will enter national office will value the preferences of their expected future constituents above directions from group leaders. We expect nationally ambitious MEPs to vote against their groups more frequently in the run-up to national elections, especially on legislation that expands EU power.
Electoral System
The electoral system conditions the nature of an MEP's future constituents. MEPs seeking a return to proportional representation systems have their fate controlled almost entirely by party leaders. Ambitious politicians who wish to return home to a country with a majoritarian electoral system, on the other hand, must satisfy both their party leaders, who will choose whether and where to run them, and local voters, who will decide whether to vote for them. These MEPs should be especially focused on ensuring member state benefits in order to win future elections in particular home districts, rather than supporting supranational institutions.
6 Such MEPs will have frequent reason to vote against their group leaderships, especially on legislation where EP leaders and national constituencies are likely to have differences of opinion, such as measures expanding the influence of the EU.
Data
To evaluate how political ambition shapes MEPs' voting behavior, we collected data on each roll-call vote in the 5th term of the European parliament (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) . We supplemented the basic voting records with descriptions of the bills considered by the MEPs, information about the votes themselves, MEP biographies, and data describing the political situations in the MEPs' home parties and nations.
Roll Call Votes and Bill Descriptions
We collected roll call tallies from the Official Journal of the European Union (European Union 2006). These data consist of yes-votes, no-votes, and abstentions recorded by a total of 875 MEPs 7 participating in each of 5778 roll call votes.
The Official Journal provides identifying bill codes for 5644 of these votes, covering 670 unique pieces of legislation. By cross-referencing these identifiers with the EP's online Legislative Observatory (OEIL) (European Parliament 2006a) we obtained four-level descriptive codes of bill issue areas. For the purpose of this project, we focus on only the first level of the issue coding, grouping the bills into eight issue areas: citizens' rights, internal market, agricultural fisheries and economies, economic and social cohesion, economic and monetary system, common foreign and security policy, justice, and the state and evolution of the Union. The last classification listed here, the state and evolution of the Union, is key to our analysis. These "European integration" bills have the potential to expand EU influence over member states and should often split group leaderships and nationally ambitious MEPs.
Finally, we augmented our data with Hix, Noury & Roland's (2006) 
MEP Characteristics
We require information describing individual MEP's career situations to explore the connections between legislative voting behavior and political ambition. To this end, we collected biographical data on all 875 MEPs from the EP web site (European Parliament 2006b).
We recorded each MEP's age, gender, and nationality. In addition, we collected timevarying 11 data covering MEPs' EP group membership and leadership positions, and national party membership.
MEP Ideology
While ambition theory seeks to explain politicians' behavior in terms of office payoff, ideology also influences their decisions. Therefore, it is important to control for MEPs' underlying policy preferences when examining the behavioral implications of career ambitions. To do so, we employ W-NOMINATE procedures to calculate spatial estimates of legislator ideal points from divisions of roll call votes (Poole & Rosenthal 1985 , Poole 2005 . 12 The first step in the process was to split the set of roll call votes in the 5th parliament in half randomly.
We then generated two-dimensional W-NOMINATE scores for each MEP on the first half of the data. 13 We used these estimates of MEP ideology from the first half of the data to fit our model of vote defection using the second half of the data. As a robustness check, we repeated our analysis, generating W-NOMINATE scores from the second half of the data and using these scores in models fit to the first half. We present only one half of this process here, but results are robust across both orders of operation. Finally, for both dimensions, we include a measure of the absolute value of the distance between the individual MEP and the score of the median group member. MEPs who are ideologically distant from their fellow group members are less likely to maintain group discipline than those MEPs who have preferences that are in line with the leadership. Greater distance between the MEP and her group median should translate into a greater probability of defection.
National and Home Party System Variables
We gathered a number of time-varying indicators of domestic member-state politics, including the percentage of legislative seats held by each MEP's home party, national party cabinet seat percentages, electoral system (majoritarian or proportional representation), and the number of days each MEP expected to pass until her next national election. We coded expected days until national election as the number of days until the election associated with the end of the nation's constitutionally mandated election period (CMEP). In cases with early elections, we coded expected days until national elections in terms of the CMEP until the date at which the national government announced early elections; at this point we updated the variable to reflect the early election date set by the government.
15 Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for all variables in the analysis.
[ which hierarchical levels to model explicitly and which groupings to control for statistically.
Binary response models (BRMs) are useful tools for analyzing the relationships between our hypothesized determinants of career ambition and MEP defections (Long 1997 ).
Nonetheless, a basic BRM cannot adequately model the hierarchical nature of our data without a number of modifications. First, we include a battery of dummy variables to model the marginal effects of EP group, national party, and country on MEP deviation probability, effectively dealing with these aspects of the complicated nesting structure in our data by brute force.
It is more difficult to model the data's panel structure. We observe the behavior of each of M MEPs repeatedly across each of V roll call votes (RCVs), with some subset of the MEPs voting on each vote. It is reasonable to expect substantial variation in defection tendency across MEPs, even after explicitly modeling determinants of political ambition:
idiosyncratic differences among MEPs influence their voting behavior. Further, there is likely to be variation in defection rates across roll-call votes: some RCVs are far more contentious than others. Unfortunately, a simple fixed effects approach-where the analyst includes dummy variables for each of the M observational units (MEPS) and/or each of the V observations (RCVs)-will not work in this case. Even if we were to follow standard panel data conventions and include fixed effects only for units, the sheer number of parameters involved would prove an insurmountable obstacle. Perhaps more importantly, fixed effects BRMs generate biased parameter estimates when V is fixed and M → ∞ (Neyman & Scott 1948 , Lancaster 2000 , Hsiao 2003 . But, if we do not take these two important sources of variation into account, we will underestimate the standard errors of our coefficients of interest (Guo & Zhao 2000) .
To overcome this problem, we estimate two-way random effects models (see e.g., Baltagi
2005), otherwise known as crossed random effects models (CREMs). The dataset contains i = 1, . . . , N observations, with each y i recording the behavior of a single MEP on a given vote. When the MEP defects on the vote, y i = 1 and it equals zero otherwise. We model the probability of MEP defection on group votes using probit CREMs of the form variance. This approach uses MEP-and RCV-specific intercepts to capture the unmodeled role of individual MEP and RCV characteristics in the probability that a particular MEP defects on a given vote. It assumes that these effects are drawn from a pair of independent normal distributions. This amounts to the assumption that both MEPs and RCVs represent independent draws from large populations with fixed within-population variances.
CREMs are especially difficult to estimate when the models contain binary response variables. Nonetheless, there exist both frequentist maximum likelihood based techniques and Bayesian approaches to estimating these models. Maximum-likelihood based methods for CREM estimation fall into two broad categories, quasi-likelihood estimation and exact max-imum likelihood estimation, while Bayesian procedures are based on Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods. Rodriguez & Goldman (2001) show that MCMC and exact maximum likelihood estimation techniques outperform quasi-likelihood approaches in random effects BRM estimation and provide evidence that quasi-likelihood estimation underestimates both fixed and random effects when random effects are substantial. Furthermore, exact maximum likelihood estimation is extremely computationally expensive, rendering its use impractical with our large dataset. Therefore, we use MCMC methods to estimate our models. The appendix provides specific estimation details.
Results
[ per cent of the variance. These findings reflect the fact that our covariates directly model a variety of individual factors-such as ideology-while vote-specific factors are largely absent from the specifications. Table 3 presents deviance information criteria (DICs) 17 for our three fixed covariate specifications, across a variety of possible statistical approaches, including basic probit models with no random intercepts, 1-way random intercepts models for both MEPs and votes, and CREMs. These statistics indicate that the CREMs fit the data best and that this improvement in fit outweighs the added complexity of these models. The
DICs further emphasize the importance of explicitly modeling variation across both MEPs and votes: while the MEP random intercepts significantly improve model fit, including the vote intercepts generates a more substantial improvement in predictive accuracy. Finally, the DICs indicate that Model 3 fits the data best, but the difference in fit across the three specifications is minimal.
[ Table 3 about here.]
Overall, the average MEP is unlikely to deviate on the average group-vote. Indeed, only 3.8% of the observations in the dataset represent defections. It is important to note that the predicted effects scale with the baseline probability of defection for a given MEP-vote.
That is, for an average observation with a low probability of defection, many covariate effects are substantively modest. Nevertheless, for an MEP-vote where the baseline probability of defection is high, the predicted effects can be quite substantial, several orders of magnitude higher than the average.
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We first turn to the results in Model 1. We argue that age is a key determinant of ambitious behavior in the EP. The effect of age is negative and statistically significant while the squared term is positive and statistically significant, indicating a U-shaped relationship between age and vote defection. As hypothesized, the effect of age on vote defection is curvilinear. The results indicate that young MEPs are responsive to variations in bill type and national election timing. The average young MEP's predicted probability of defection is between 0.1 and 1.7 points higher for European integration bills than others, when elections are 870 days away (the dataset mean). For a young MEP with a high baseline defection rate, the probability of defecting on a European integration bill is as much as 14 points higher than on a non-integration bill. For middle-aged and older MEPs, the type of bill has substantially smaller predicted impacts.
The results also predict that a young MEP is between 1.1 and 1.9 times as likely to defect on a group vote right before a national election than three-and-a-half years before an election. Again, the national election proximity effects for middle-aged and older MEPs are more modest. For middle-aged MEPs, national election proximity has a slight, statistically significant effect on the probability of defection, but old MEPs do not respond to national election timing. These results imply that younger and middle-aged MEPs drive the integration interaction effects in Model 2. Younger MEPs react strongly to both bill type and election timing.
Similarly, middle-aged MEPs react in a statistically significant manner to both election timing and bill type, but at lower substantive levels. This finding is consistent with the possibility that a relatively small number of middle-aged MEPs still covet national office.
Older MEPs, on the other hand, cruise along at a steady predicted probability of defection, ignoring integration bills in addition to election timing.
Finally, Model 3 extends Model 2 to investigate the impact of electoral system on MEP voting. Again, the estimates for the main effects remain similar across models. We hypothesized that MEPs from nations holding majoritarian elections would exhibit a greater sensitivity to national prerogatives than their counterparts in proportional representation (PR) systems, especially on legislation dealing with EU expansion. The statistically significant and positive coefficients for majoritarianism and the interaction between majoritarianism and European integration bills in Model 3 support this hypothesis. This effect is also substantively significant; on European integration votes, a majoritarian MEP is between 1.8 and 6.3 times more likely to defect than an MEP from a PR or mixed system, on average.
Conclusion
By taking advantage of the unique institutional structure of the EP, we are able to identify how different career paths shape behavior while holding the legislative agenda and macropolitical conditions constant. Our results support the primary pillar of ambition theory:
MEPs are forward-looking. Young MEPs have the largest potential to return to national politics and are more likely than their colleagues to contravene the dictates of EP group leaders. But the relationship between ambition and behavior is not simply a function of a politician's stage in life; the political opportunity structure also shapes how MEPs vote.
National election timing, size and governing status of the national party, and the electoral system all shape incentives to defect from group votes. Perhaps most importantly, ambitious
MEPs position themselves for national careers in a focused manner, breaking with EP leaders on legislation that determines the relative strengths of EU and national institutions. That is, their career goals lead them to work to the detriment of their current office since they believe that the resulting long-run distribution of power will benefit them more.
Substantively, the results imply a link between the candidate nomination strategies of national-level parties and the pace of integration in the EU. Parties have two basic nomination choices for European elections. First, they can use European elections as a dumping ground for candidates who have little future in national politics. For instance, they can nominate older politicians to the EP, rewarding them with "retirement" positions. Or parties can try to kick difficult and undisciplined national-level politicians upstairs to the EP.
As MEPs, however, these politicians have little incentive to preserve member state powers and will instead support increased authority for supranational institutions. Alternatively, parties can use European elections as a proving ground for young politicians. These parties take the work of the EP seriously and value service there as an important stepping-stone to a national career. Ironically, it is the MEPs from these parties who have the most incentive to weaken Europe's supranational institutions in favor of member state prerogatives. As service in the EP becomes more useful for many nationally-ambitious politicians, therefore, pressure to expand the powers of European institutions generally, and the EP specifically, will decrease. Developing a fuller theory of candidate nomination strategies and empirically tracing the careers of individual MEPs will help identify the causal relationships between progressive ambition, legislative behavior, and European integration.
Further, ambition politics within the EP may shape interactions between EU institutions.
Our results indicate that incentives for defection vary according to the timing of national- as latent variables and introduces a new vector of latent variables z, such that
where we assume each independent and identically distributed i ∼ N(0, 1) and
This is the familiar latent variable specification of the probit BRM and implies that
or, in other words, the latent variable specification in equations 2 and 3 is equivalent to the binary response CREM described by Equation 1 k is the number of observations in the kth unit of classification c, n m is the number of MEPs and n v is the number of votes):
, where
6. Simulate each z i from the truncated normal distributions
This algorithm directly simulates from the posterior distributions of not only the fixed coefficients and random effects variances but also from the posteriors of all three sets of latent variables, allowing the analyst to work with the estimated posterior distributions of the random intercepts and to perform residual analysis based on z using familiar techniques from linear regression modeling.
In our analysis of MEP voting behavior, we estimated each model by running the Gibbs sampler for 55,000 iterations, discarding the first 5,000 iterations and retaining every 50th iteration for a final posterior sample of 1,000 observations. Standard diagnostic tests generated results consistent with chain convergence for all three models and results are robust to variation in chain starting values and prior specification. In addition, penalized quasilikelihood estimates of logistic versions of these models produce substantively similar results to the MCMC probit approach. We performed all MCMC computation in C++ using the Scythe Statistical Library (Pemstein, Quinn & Martin 2007) .
Notes
1 Over-time analysis provides one technique for overcoming this shortcoming, and such research has helped to explain phenomena like the rise of careerism in American politics (Brady, Buckley & Rivers 1999) .
2 The EP was established in 1957. Direct election to the EP, however, commenced only in 1979. Before this it was composed of appointed national delegations. 4 Although the use of quota systems at the party or national levels create more slots for women in domestic politics, it is not clear that those opportunities will affect the legislative behavior of women MEPs. Electoral quotas expand the demand for women candidates, while the pool of "quality" women candidates (i.e., those with some sort of experience holding political office) is likely to be small. Therefore, parties may choose women as candidates even if those women have not done as much to serve the interests of the party. Women
MEPs interested in a career in domestic politics, therefore, do not necessarily face the same behavioral incentives as male MEPs with the same ambitions.
5 National elections provide important opportunities to return to national politics for
MEPs from all member states. In some member states, local or regional elections may also provide the possibility of domestic office. Nonetheless, because the importance of these local and regional opportunities varies considerably across member-states, we leave a direct analysis of their impact to future research. 18 The models generate numerous in-sample predictions of the probability of defection in excess of 0.5.
19 To compute average within-sample predicted probabilities we calculate the predicted probability of defection for each observation in the dataset and then average the predictions.
This produces a representative estimate of predicted effects in contrast to choosing a single "representative" MEP-vote or setting covariates at their means. Because of the size of our dataset, we performed this operation on a random sub-sample of 1000 MEP-votes from the dataset, rather than on all of the data.
20 Effect ranges are based on 95% credible intervals around average predicted probabilities.
21 Although the coefficient for party cabinet percentage only reaches conventional levels of statistical significance in Model 2, Model 1 estimates that the coefficient is negative with probability 0.88, while the corresponding probability is 0.87 in Model 3. Therefore, the negative relationship between party cabinet percentage and vote defection is generally supported across all three models. We present estimated posterior means and, in parentheses, standard deviations. All models include full batteries of fixed effects for EP group, nation, and national party (when more than one MEP represented that party in the 5th EP) and an intercept term (not shown). M = 575; V = 2124; N = 621627. * The 90% Bayesian credible interval for this coefficient excludes zero. * * The 95% Bayesian credible interval for this coefficient excludes zero. a Age is scaled to tens of years. b Young MEPs are 40 years old or less. c Old MEPs are 65 years old or more. d Time until national election is scaled to hundreds of days. 
